Advanced Game Theory (POLS514)

Emory University · Fall 2026

Course Description

This course is the second in the political science formal theory sequence. It builds on introductory game theory by extending the solution concepts from POLS 513 to richer games and—crucially—by teaching students to build original models rather than merely solve those built by others. Topics include repeated interaction and commitment, signaling, information design, mechanism design, bargaining, and principal–agent relationships.

Course Logistics

Term: Fall 2026 (first class Thu, Aug 27; last class Tue, Dec 8)
Meetings: Tuesdays & Thursdays, 1:00–2:15 PM · Tarbutton Hall 111
Instructor: John W. Patty · 305 Tarbutton Hall · jwpatty@gmail.com
Office hours: Remote, by appointment — make an appointment here
Course platform: Enrolled students — all materials posted to Canvas

Syllabus

The Fall 2026 course syllabus is located here — full session-by-session schedule and readings.

Who Should Take This Course

This is a graduate course. I assume everyone is comfortable with the following, all covered in POLS 513:

Dominance and iterated elimination;
Expected payoffs and mixed/behavior strategies;
Nash equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium; and
Bayes–Nash equilibrium.

An ungraded diagnostic goes out in the first week so you can flag any gaps early.

Texts

Required: Steven Tadelis, Game Theory: An Introduction (Princeton University Press, 2013). ISBN 9780691129082.
Recommended: Scott Gehlbach, Formal Models of Domestic Politics, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2022). ISBN 9781139045544.

Individual articles and my own notes make up the remaining required readings; all are posted to Canvas.

What We Cover

I. Theoretical Foundations — repeated interaction, commitment, dynamic Bayesian games, signaling, reputation.
II. Communication & Information Design — cheap talk, Crawford–Sobel, belief refinements, Bayesian persuasion.
III. Mechanism Design, Markov Equilibria & Commitment.
IV. The Craft of Formal Theory — a four-session unit on how models are built, argued, and written.
V. Applied Political Models — electoral competition, delegation, principal–agent theory, legislative bargaining, global games.
VI. Synthesis & Paper Development — peer workshops and individual paper meetings.

Grading

Four homework assignments — 25%
Model proposal (due Thu, Oct 15) — 5%
First draft of paper (due Tue, Nov 17) — 10%
Final paper (due Sat, Dec 19, 11:59 PM) — 35%
Participation — 25%

Grades are not rounded. All submitted work is prepared in LaTeX and submitted as a PDF on Canvas.

Lecture Notes

Notes on the Beer-Quiche Game and the D1 Belief Refinement.
Notes on Global Games.
Notes on Bayesian Persuasion.

Past Assignments

Note: Solutions located on course Canvas page

Supplemental Materials

Debraj Ray’s Notes on The One-Shot Deviation Principle
Maskin and Sjostrom’s Handbook Chapter on Implementation
Patty and Penn (2014), “Sequential Decision Making and Information Aggregation in Small Networks”
- Slides for Short Talk
Gailmard and Patty (2018), “Giving Advice Versus Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation”
- Slides for Long Talk
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), “Bayesian Persuasion“
Morris and Shin (2001), “Global Games: Theory and Applications“
Myerson (2000), “Large Poisson Games“
Romer and Rosenthal (1978), “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo“
Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2010), “Quantal Response Equilibria“
Fearon (1999), “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance“
Akerlof and Kranton (2000), “Economics and Identity“
Benabou (2015), “The Economics of Motivated Beliefs“
Patty (2016), “Signaling through Obstruction“
James Peck’s Notes on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium