Course Description and Syllabus
Description. This course is the second in the formal theory sequence offered in the political science department. The class builds on the skills learned in the Introduction of Game Theory class by applying the solution concepts learned in the introductory course to more complicated games. The course will address many topics, including (but not limited to): bargaining, principal-agent relationships, and signaling games.
Syllabus
The course syllabus is located here.
Office Hours
My office hours are by appointment this semester. (but I am very happy to meet!) Make an appointment here.
Lecture Notes
- Notes on the Beer-Quiche Game and the D1 Belief Refinement.
- Notes on Global Games.
- Notes on Bayesian Persuasion.
Homework Assignments
- Homework #1 (Due September 13th.)
- Homework #2 (Due September 30th.)
- Homework #3 (Due October 21st.)
- Homework #4 (Due November 4th.)
- Homework #5 (Due November 25th.)
Past Assignments
Note: Solutions located on course Canvas page
- Homework 1: Refresher
- Homework 2: Multistage and Repeated Games
- Midterm Exam
- Homework 3: Static Bayesian Games
- Homework 4: Dynamic Bayesian Games
Supplemental Materials
- Debraj Ray’s Notes on The One-Shot Deviation Principle
- Maskin and Sjostrom’s Handbook Chapter on Implementation
- Patty and Penn (2014), “Sequential Decision Making and Information Aggregation in Small Networks”
- Gailmard and Patty (2018), “Giving Advice Versus Making Decisions: Transparency, Information, and Delegation”
- Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011), “Bayesian Persuasion“
- Morris and Shin (2001), “Global Games: Theory and Applications“
- Myerson (2000), “Large Poisson Games“
- Romer and Rosenthal (1978), “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo“
- Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2010), “Quantal Response Equilibria“
- Fearon (1999), “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance“
- Akerlof and Kranton (2000), “Economics and Identity“
- Benabou (2015), “The Economics of Motivated Beliefs“
- Patty (2016), “Signaling through Obstruction“
- James Peck’s Notes on Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium